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I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, gender and racial diversity in politics-and, consequently,
gender and racial prejudice in society-has reemerged as a hot topic in
the popular media.' The heightened interest began in 2008 with the
appointment of Nancy Pelosi as the first woman to serve as Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives and picked up steam with the
presidential bids of democratic party candidates then-Senator Hillary
Clinton-a white woman-and then-Senator Barack Obama-a black
man.2 The historic election of President Barack Hussein Obama as the
forty-fourth President of the United States fueled pundits' speculation
that the United States had entered a "post-racial" society. 3 Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton's presidential bid and Associate Justices Sonia
Sotomayor's and Elena Kagan's appointments by President Obama to

1. See, e.g., Nancy Cook, Race, Ideology Shaped Super Tuesday Vote, NPR (Feb. 6, 2008),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.phpstoryld=18738766 ("Super Tuesday's results . . .
prov[ed] that race, class, gender and political ideology do matter in this presidential race."); Rick
Klein, Pelosi: Clinton Camp Played Gender Card, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www

.abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=3821689&page=1 ("[Hillary Clinton's] campaign
appears to be exploiting perceptions of Clinton facing down a field of aggressive male
challengers."). Numerous discussions on Internet blogs and television shows referenced race,
gender, and politics. The television show Saturday Night Live lampooned Senator Clinton the
weekend before the West Virginia primary with respect to reports that many in the state would
support her candidacy because she is white, while Senator Obama is black. Identity politics"political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of
certain social groups"-truly has entered mainstream consciousness. Cressida Heyes, Identity
Politics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY (July 16, 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/

identity-politics/. On May 7, 2008, a brief search for the terms "race," "gender," "politics," and
"Washington Post" or "Associated Press" revealed over 207,000 hits for web pages referencing
all of those terms.
2.

See Dan Balz, Race and Gender Make Democrats' Field Historic, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,

2007, at A01 (discussing the nominations of Clinton and Obama); Andrea Stone, Pelosi Soon to
Make History as First Female Speaker of the House, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2006, 3:46 AM),

http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2006/CA/2006-11-08-pelosi-profile
(discussing Pelosi's election as Speaker of the House).

x.htm

3. See Joel Anderson, Burying "Post-Racial": We're So Farfrom Achieving a Post-Racial
Society that Even Using the Term is Harmful, AM. PROSPECT (July 28, 2010), http://www

.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=buryingpost racial ("[I]t's time we retire the notion that we are
'post-racial."'); Tom Burrell, A Post-Racial US.? Are You Kidding? Obama's Election Brought
Some Kinds of Bigotry to the Surface, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (June 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://

www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2010/06/18/2010-06-18_a_postracialusare_you_kidding
obamaselection broughtsome kindsof bigotryto.html ("Obama's election less than two
years ago sparked a momentary illusion that we had gotten past race. It turns out, far from
ushering in a post-racial era, the election of Obama has in fact unleashed the rabid dog of fear,
bigotry, hate and ignorance."); Ron Todt, Andrew Breitbart: Obama Is Not "Post-Racial," GRIo

(July 31, 2010, 8:30 PM), http://www.thegrio.com/politics/andrew-breitbart-obama-is-not-postracial.php (discussing Obama's tacit promise to be a post-racial candidate).
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the U.S. Supreme Court have fueled media coverage about whether the
United States has become a "post-gender" 4 or "post-racial" society.5
Commentators tend to agree that race and gender still matter,
although they disagree about what to do about it. 6 Examples of gender
and race subordination abound. For instance, with regard to gender,
many women are forced to be full-time stay-at-home mothers due to a
public policy design that lacks childcare subsidies and because low-

4. See, e.g., Talk of the Nation, Hillary'sBig Moment: Are We Post-Gender?, NPR (Aug. 27,

2008, 1:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/2008/08/last-night senator hillarycli.html
(debating whether the United States is now a post-gender society).
5. See Hilary Hurd Anyaso, Post-Racial Society?, NW. U. NEWS CENTER (Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2010/08/postracial-diversity-obama.html (citing
HARVEY YOUNG, EMBODYING BLACK EXPERIENCE: STILLNESS, CRITICAL MEMORY AND THE
BLACK BODY (2010)) ("President Obama is the most visible representation of the way race
functions in America today . . . ."); Lois Danks, The Myth of Post-racialSociety, DISSIDENT
VOICE (June 26, 2010), http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/06/the-myth-of-a-post-racial-society/
(discussing a Black History Month forum's conclusion that "racism is still rampant in the United
States"); Nat Hentoff, National View: Are Americans Ready for a Post-racial Society?,

METROWEST DAILY NEWS (July 10, 2009, 8:57 AM), http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/
(discussing
opinion/x968676954/National-View-Are-Americans-ready-for-a-post-racial-society
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), and deeming it
evidence that America has yet to achieve post-racial status).
6. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialismand the Gates Controversy:
The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian 82 (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper

No. 10-16, 2010) (arguing for the development of "a scholarly program revealing . . . that post
racialism, while explicitly progressive, hides implicit bias from view"); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
George Scott Parks, Implicit Bias, Election '08, and the Myth of a Post-Racial America 1 (2009)
(working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1456509 ("Although President Obama's
election means that explicit, open anti-Black racism has largely faded, an analysis of the
campaign's rhetoric and themes suggests that unconscious racism is alive and well."); Cheryl
Harris, Are We Post-Racial Yet? Can We Be? Do We Want to Be?, NEGOTIATION LAW BLOG

(May 1, 2009), http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/2009/05/articles/truth-justice-and-theamerican/are-we-postracial-yet-can-we-be-do-we-want-to-be/ ("Post-racialism maybe one can
think of is the destination that color-blindness is supposed to get us to.. . . [Ilf we really want to
interrogate the possibilities of racial justice or racial reconciliation, we're not going to get very far
if the starting point is that we have already gotten beyond the problem."); Devona Walker,
Maureen Dowd Misdiagnosed Obama's Race Problem, ALTERNET (July 28, 2010, 9:41 AM),

http://blogs.altemet.org/speakeasy/2010/07/28/maureen-dowd-misdiagnosed-obamas-raceproblem/ ("[W]hen the President was elected, many Americans somehow thought he singlehandedly ushered in a new post-racial era in America. Some conservative journalists even
speculated that because a black man had been elected to the highest office in the land, we could
finally put to bed affirmative action policies and that blacks would suddenly realize that racism
was something of the past."); cf Are We Living in a Post-RacialAmerica?, NPR (Feb. 11, 2009),

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-100557180 ("President Barack Obama is
the country's first African American president. For some, his victory has ushered in a post racial
era in which there is less need for Americans to talk about race. But not everyone agrees."); John
McWhorter, It's Official: America is "Post-Racial"in the Age of Obama, GRIO (Jan. 14, 2010,

10:20 AM), http://www.thegrio.com/opinion/its-official-america-is-postracial-in-the-age-ofobama.php (arguing that Obama's election demonstrates that "race does not matter in America
the way it used to" and that the United States has almost achieved post-racial status).
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wage employers frown upon keeping pregnant workers. 7 Twenty-three
percent of predominantly professional mothers quit their jobs because of
the "lack of affordable, high-quality paid childcare." 8
Like examples of gender subordination, examples of race
subordination also abound. Church burnings in Alabama were aimed at
the communities of color in rural areas that even today lack basic
infrastructure such as schools, libraries, roads, and housing.9 Noose
displays and similar intimidation tactics followed President Obama's
election.10 In July 2010, the Agriculture Secretary asked Shirley
Sherrod, an African American female ex-employee of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, to resign her position after officials
misconstrued her remarks regarding how she had overcome her racial
bias due to an experience helping a white farmer.11 She had told a
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People group in
1986, "I was struggling with the fact that so many black people had lost
their farm land, and here I was faced with having to help a [w]hite
person save their land. So I didn't give him the full force of what I
7. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSEY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, CTR. FOR
WoRKLIFE LAW, THE THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE
PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING MIDDLE 7, 30 (2010), available at http://www.worklifelaw
.org/pubs/ThreeFacesofWork-FamilyConflict.pdf ("Calls to the Center for WorkLife Law's
hotline for family caregivers reveal the lengths low-wage employers will go to 'get rid of
pregnant workers. One caller reported being forced to undergo monthly 'drug tests' that, upon
further investigation, appear to have been pregnancy tests, because only women were required to

take them."). Other examples from callers include a woman who was fired when she became
pregnant and was offered her job back upon the condition of her having an abortion. Id at 30.
Reported lawsuits cite the following reasons for women being fired because of their pregnancy: a
hotel kitchen is "no place for a pregnant woman to be"; where pregnant women worked at a front
desk "it didn't look good"; and a bartender "could not keep up." Id. Middle-income women are
more likely to face discrimination after they give birth and return to work, where they are warned
not to get pregnant again and ridiculed for having to take their child to medical appointments. Id.
at 45.
8. Id at 57. The authors note, "One attorney, despite excellent evaluations, was passed over
repeatedly for promotions that were offered to less qualified men with children and to a woman
without children." Id. at 58.
9. See, e.g., Rusty Dornin et al., Suspect: Church Fires Started as "Joke": Three Birmingham
College Students Arrested, Charged,CNN.COM L. CENTER (Mar. 9, 2006, 4:32 AM), http://www

.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/08/alabama.churches/ (discussing
churches, five of which had primarily black congregations).
10.

the burning of nine Alabama

See, e.g., Obama Election Spurs Race Threats, Crimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 15,

2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27738018/ ("Cross burnings. Schoolchildren
chanting 'Assassinate Obama.' Black figures hung from nooses. Racial epithets scrawled on
homes and cars. Incidents around the country referring to President-elect Barack Obama are
dampening the postelection glow of racial progress and harmony, highlighting the stubborn

racism that remains in America.").
11. AFRO Staff, Top USDA Employee Resigns After Remarks are ConsideredRacist, AFRO
(July 21, 2010), http://www.afro.com/sections/news/afro-briefs/story.htm?storyid= 1975.
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could do. I did enough."' 2 Ms. Sherrod later explained that she told the
story because "working with him helped me to see that it wasn't a
[b]lack and [w]hite issue." 13 Ultimately, Sherrod overcame her
prejudice and worked with the farmer for two years to save the family
farm. 14
These anecdotes demonstrate that gender and racial bias are heated
issues. "[M]any of the prejudices and racial issues that have haunted
the U.S. for centuries continue today . . . ." 5 In a society that has not

yet reached post-gender or post-racial status, it is far from clear that
simply labeling it "post-gender" and "post-racial" and shutting down the
dialogue about race will transform the society into a "post-gender,"
"post-racial" one. Of course, women and people of color are not
monolithic groups. Individuals' experiences differ. However, "[w]e
also need to appreciate how issues such as racial profiling target [black]
bodies regardless of age, gender, sexuality and class." 16 Similarly,
issues such as workforce sexual harassment target women due to their
gender and impact women as a group. 17 This is not to say that men do
not face sexual harassment or that white people are never the target of
discrimination. However, it is to say that racial and gender
subordination targets individuals based on observable personal
characteristics. Although women and people of color are achieving ever
more prominent positions of power, gender and race still matter in the
United States.
In addition to race and gender, class also still matters. Incomes
declined across all wage groups due to the 2008 financial crisis.18
However, the crisis served to create a less equal society in terms of
economic power. 19 Although the severe stock market declines in 2008
caused income from securities trading to drop for the affluent, "[o]n
every other income front, the affluent more than held their own. In
2008, excluding income from stock trades and other capital gains,
America's top 10 percent actually slightly increased their share of the
nation's wealth." 20 The redistribution of wealth from the lower and
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id
Id.
Id
Anyaso, supra note 5.
Id. (quoting YOUNG, supra note 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).

17. See id.
18. See generally Sam Pizzigati, America's Top Incomes: Down but Certainly Not Out,
WORKING GROUP ON EXTREME INEQUALITY (July 24, 2010), http://extremeinequality.org/

?p= 23 7 (analyzing the U.S. income gap).
19. Id

20. Id.
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middle income levels to the United States' most wealthy citizens reveals
that the Great Recession served to widen the gap between the wealthy
and everyone else. The recovery from the Great Recession has
benefited mainly the top 1 percent.2 1
As another example, the unemployment rate at the end of July 2010
was approximately 9.5 percent.2 2 Breaking this statistic down further,
the unemployment rate at the top of the economic ladder-bachelor's
degree or higher-was 4.5 percent.2 3 For the middle class, including
high school graduates and those with some college education or an
associate's degree, it was 9.2 percent; 24 and for those at the bottom of
the economic ladder-less than a high school diploma-it was 13.8
percent. 25 The unemployment rate among adult men was 9.7 percent,
and among adult women was 7.9 percent. 26 The unemployment rate
was 15.6 percent among African Americans and 12.1 percent among
Hispanics. 27 Employment statistics fail to account for the
underemployed and for those who have ceased to look for employment
because none is available. 28 The United States has become an
increasingly class-based society. 29 As more women and minorities find
themselves in the lower economic classes, class disadvantages only
exacerbate the gender and racial subordination mentioned earlier.
There are calls to overcome gender and racial subordination through
efforts to diversify in many areas, but especially for diversity among the
members of the political, corporate, and academic elite in American
society. 30 In particular, commentators call for greater gender and racial
2 1. Id.
22.

U.S. Dep't of Labor, Economic News Release: Employment Situation Summary, BUREAU

LABOR STAT. (Aug. 6, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit
08062010.htm.
23. Id.
24. This percentage was obtained by averaging the unemployment rates for high school
graduates and individuals with some college education or an associate's degree.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id
29. See generally Jas Writer, Class-Based Society in America, SOCYBERTY (Dec. 8, 2008),

http://socyberty.com/society/class-based-society-in-america/ ("[C]Iass-based society has become
the usual norm within all modem and postmodern realities of social organization, as applied ...
to almost all contemporary nations.").
30. See, e.g., Tracy Anbinder Baron, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Court's
Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267, 283-306 (1994)

(discussing judicial failure to deal with employment discrimination); Timothy A. Canova,
Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions: A Comparison of Mandatory Bargaining
Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257, 295-96 (comparing the U.S.

and Swedish legal regimes governing collective bargaining, and proposing that boards should
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diversity on corporate boards.3 1 Literature in the areas of corporate
social responsibility and law and socioeconomics, as well as a growing
number of studies at the intersection of corporate law and critical race
theory, argue: (1) gender and racial diversity on corporate boards is
essential to better governance and decision making and may lead to
greater corporate profitability; 32 and (2) boards should seek racial and
gender diversity out of fairness and equity concerns. 33 In fact,
commentators have emphasized that boards should strive for viewpoint
diversity, not simply gender and racial diversity, because independent
thinking-which may lead to better governance-is one goal of

include labor representatives); Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate
Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST.

JoHN's L. REV. 1105, 1106-38 (2005) (comparing and contrasting "the experiences of women
and people of color on corporate boards and discuss[ing] how the differences in those experiences
might impact their ultimate success in achieving greater representation on corporate boards");
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporationsand Their Shareholders,

65 MD. L. REV. 538, 539 (2006) ("[S]hareholder primacy doctrine prevents examination of the
interests of those not adequately represented in prior corporate law colloquy."); Steven A.
Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's
Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1600-12 (2004) (arguing

that convergence theory is the key to true race reform in the corporate board selection process);
Janis Sarra, Class Act: Considering Race and Gender in the Corporate Boardroom, 79 ST.

JOHN'S L. REV. 1121, 1121-25 (2005) (arguing that lack of diversity of corporate boards
exacerbates race and gender discrimination issues); Cheryl L. Wade, Transforming
DiscriminatoryCorporateCulture: This is Not Just Women's Work 7-9 (St. John's Legal Studies

Research Paper No. 06-0041, 2006) (arguing that CEOs may influence corporate culture in order
to achieve racial and gender equality).
31.

See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of

Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1365-66 (2002) (arguing that the corporate social responsibility
movement may provide a solution to race, gender, and ethnic inequality on corporate boards of
directors); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the
Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 797 (2005)

(analyzing "business rationales for diversity ... to determine whether such rationales can or
should be used as a basis for justifying efforts to increase board diversity"); Fairfax, supra note
30, at 1110-14 (arguing that there are "miles to go" in increasing racial and gender diversity on
corporate boards).
32. See Dallas, supra note 31, at 1365-66 (arguing that the corporate social responsibility
movement may provide a solution to race, gender, and ethnic inequality on corporate boards of
directors); Fairfax, supra note 31, at 795-97 (describing the business rationales that have been
used for advocating greater diversity in corporate settings).
33. See, e.g., Douglas Branson, No Seat at the Table: How CorporateGovernance and Law

Keep Women Out of the Boardroom 92-94 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 2007-11, 2007) (arguing that the number of women directors is still static and growing
slowly and that "the glass ceiling still seems firmly in place"); Wade, supra note 30, at 353-54
("A CEO's sincere commitment to workplace race and gender equity is a prerequisite to
achieving fairness for women and minority employees."). For further consideration of this
literature, see infra Parts III.A. and IV.A (describing the cultural cognition theory and the
changing role of risk in corporate law, respectively).
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diversity, and that goal is best served by having a variety of different
viewpoints on corporate boards. 34
Recommendations for greater board diversity may overlook a
growing body of empirical research on cultural cognition. 35 Whereas
corporate social responsibility and corporate law scholarship use the
results of empirical research on gender and racial composition of
corporate boards on governance and corporate profitability, legal
scholarship mostly disregards the research on cultural cognition and
worldview diversity. 36 The evidence suggests that worldview bias may
create misperception of risks on corporate boards and lead to biased
corporate decision making. 37
Cultural cognition studies suggest that individuals conform their
assessment of risk to their vision of an ideal society-their cultural

34. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: Just

How Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373, 376-77, 391-95 (2007) (discussing how
diversity broadly may generate independent thinking); Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the
Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 552-56 (2009) (arguing that worldview diversity
may mitigate a lack of independent thinking on corporate boards).
35. See Burch, supra note 34, at 537-44 (discussing the Yale Law School Cultural Cognition
Project's study on cultural bias and the white male effect).
36. Id.
37. A majority of the directors of large, publicly held corporations are white males who are
affluent and highly educated and who hold executive positions or are retired from executive
positions. Demonstrated ability to lead in a hierarchical organizational structure, to act quickly
and decisively, and to commit to a decision are some of the attributes of individuals who achieve
top management positions. These behavioral characteristics are consistent with hierarchical and
individualistic norms. A recent study of Fortune 1000 companies demonstrated that women were
represented on 82 percent of corporate boards; 76 percent of Fortune 1000 boards included at
least one ethnic minority. Fairfax, supra note 30, at t107. The number of companies with ethnic
and gender diversity generally has increased over the last ten years. See ALLEN L. WHITE, Bus.
FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, THE STAKEHOLDER FIDUCIARY: CSR, GOVERNANCE AND THE

FUTURE OF BOARDS 3-17 (2006), http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSRAW Corporate-Boards.pdf

(arguing a corporate board should be a stakeholder rather than a shareholder and fiduciary, which
would thus make corporate boards adaptable to "the changing nature of the social contract
between business and society"). The percentage of minority men on Fortune 100 corporate
boards declined slightly between 2004 and 2006 from 11.88 percent to 11.40 percent. ALLIANCE
FOR BD. DIVERSITY,

WOMEN

AND

MINORITIES ON

FORTUNE

100 BOARDS

6

(2008),

Furthermore, the number of
http://www.proutgroup.com/Resources/abdreportfinal2008.pdf.
women and minorities as a percentage of the total number of board seats remains small. Seventyone percent of directorships at these Fortune 100 companies were held by white males and "[a]ll
women and all minority men held less than one-third of board director seats." Id. at 9. For
example, as of 2006, 1,219 board seats existed on Fortune 100 companies; 17.06 percent of those
were held by women and 15.42 percent by minorities. Id. at 6. Moreover, minorities held an
average of 1.18 board seats. Id. African American directors held an average of 1.31 board seats.
Id. While three corporations had no women on their boards, up from only one in 2004, it was not
uncommon to find a board with no minorities, particularly no Asian Americans or Hispanic
Americans. Id. at 7.
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viewpoint or worldview. 38 Cultural cognition theorists assert that
cultural cognition is distinct from other decision-making processes, such
as "loss aversion," 39 "status quo bias,"4 0 and "group polarization."4 1
Instead,
[p]erhaps because of upbringing, perhaps because of genetic
disposition, or perhaps because of some combination of the two,
people form hierarchic, egalitarian, individualistic, or communitarian
cultural commitments. These commitments, in turn, supply the values
to which individuals conform their beliefs and define the relevant
groups within which social influences on belief operate. 42
Cultural cognition is not the same as a predisposition to hold certain
values or beliefs due to race and gender. Individuals' views of the
"ideal society" more strongly influence risk perception than do race and
gender. 43
The theory of cultural cognition lends support to recommendations
for greater board diversity. First, the theory has descriptive power in
that it may apply particularly to explain one important factor operating
in board decision making-the way that corporate boards weigh the
costs and benefits of certain activities. Second, even if worldviews are
outweighed by other factors in board decision making, such as group
dynamics, diversity of viewpoint is still important given that boards

38. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the
White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (2007) [hereinafter

Kahan et al., Culture and Identity] ("[T]he white-male effect might derive from a congeniality
between hierarchical and individualistic worldviews . . . and a posture of extreme risk
skepticism."); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second NationalRisk and Culture Study: Making Sense
of-and Making Progress In-The American Culture War of Fact 2 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law

Working Paper No. 154, 2007) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Second National Risk], available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1017189 ("The 'cultural cognition thesis'
asserts that people's beliefs about risk are shaped by their core values.").
39. Loss aversion is defined as "the tendency for people to strongly prefer avoiding losses
than acquiring gains. Some studies suggest that losses are as much as twice as psychologically
powerful than gains. This leads to risk aversion when people evaluate a possible gain; since
people prefer avoiding losses to making gains."

Loss Aversion-Definition, WORDIQ.COM,

http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Lossaversion (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
40. Status quo bias is defined as "cognitive bias for the status quo; in other words, people like
things to stay relatively the same."

Status Quo Bias-Definition, WORDIQ.coM, http://www

.wordiq.com/definition/Statusquo bias (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
41. Group polarization is defined as "the tendency of people to make decisions that are more
extreme when they are in a group, as opposed to a decision made alone or independently." Group
Polarization, W1KIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilGrouppolarization (last modfied Jan. 6,
2011).
42. Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk: "Values" or "Blunders"?,

119 HARv. L. REV. F. 166, 170 (2006).
43. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 466; Kahan et al., Second National
Risk, supra note 38, at 2.
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have become more active in considering corporate decisions. Third,
worldviews may be tested empirically-viewpoint diversity is easier to
create if it can be quantified.
In addition to lending support to requests for greater board diversity,
the theory has normative and prescriptive value. Normatively, the
theory suggests that one should ask whether diversity of directors'
views of the ideal society is wanted, because such diversity may impede
decision making. The theory's prescriptive aspects may be used to
devise or assess solutions to increasing board diversity; e.g., board
training, director pipeline programs, such as the DirectWomen Board
Institute, demographics disclosure mandates under federal law, and
mandated diversity requirements.44
This Article proposes that greater worldview diversity on corporate
boards may lead to better governance and mitigate bias and unfairness
in corporate decision making. Also, it recommends greater gender and
racial diversity as a way to achieve greater worldview diversity.
Part II of this Article summarizes the empirical research on the
gender and racial composition of corporate boards. It discusses
corporate board demographics for publicly traded corporations. Also, it
reviews research on the effect of board diversity on corporate
profitability, including monitoring and decision making. In general, the
empirical evidence suggests that gender and racial diversity may
correlate positively with corporate profitability; i.e., as gender and racial

44. See, e.g., Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-9089, 3461175, 47 Fed. Reg. 68,834 (Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Proxy Disclosure Enhancements],
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf (discussing the SEC's new
disclosure rules, requiring disclosure of "compensation policies and practices[,] . . . director and
nominee qualifications[,] . . . [and] board leadership structure"); Douglas M. Branson, Still
Square Pegs in Round Holes? A Look at ANCSA Corporations, Corporate Governance, and
Indeterminate Form or Operation of Legal Entities, 24 ALASKA L. REv. 203, 215-17 (2007)

("Precepts of modem corporate governance speak to the following: board size, elimination of
trophy directors, board and boardroom decorum, director training, director performance reviews,
and standards of the corporation. . . . Post-SOX, a number of law and business schools now offer
week long courses for directors . . . ."); Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate
Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 56-57 (2009) (noting countries like Norway have enacted
a Corporate Board Quota law ("CBQ") that mandates "that all publicly-listed corporations in
Norway repopulate their boards to include at least forty percent women by January 1, 2008....
Noncompliance [] result[s] in dissolution of the corporation."); Marina v.N. Whitman, Keynote
Address: Corporate Governance and Sustainable Peace: An Insider's View, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 726-27 (2003) ("Now, not only do most of these companies set up internal

training programs for new directors, but there is a whole industry of consulting firms and
universities, particularly law schools and business schools, that run programs for corporate
directors."); About DirectWomen: Overview, DIRECT WOMEN, http://directwomen.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2011) (discussing DirectWomen, which promotes independence and diversity in
corporate governance).
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diversity increases, so may share price. 45 However, further evidence
may point to the opposite. 4 6
Part III discusses the theory of cultural cognition and the empirical
projects at the Yale Cultural Cognition Center. It suggests that cultural
cognition affects board members' perceptions of risk taking. 47 The
findings on worldview bias may be consistent with the findings on
whether board diversity leads to increased corporate profitability or
greater shareholder value. For example, it may be that the addition of
one or two "diverse" board members, in and of itself, does little to
mitigate structural worldview bias and the skewed risk perceptions that
exist among most corporate boards. This could be due to a number of
factors, including group dynamics. However, another factor could be
that chief executive officers and board members seek board nominees
who replicate the worldviews of the board majority. 48 This part
concludes by explaining why board racial and gender diversity alone
may not mitigate skewed risk perceptions on boards and suggests that
greater worldview diversity may be in a corporation's best interests
from an equity and fairness viewpoint.
Part IV elaborates on the position that worldview diversity, as well as
gender and racial diversity, is an important corporate goal from an
equity and fairness viewpoint.4 9 Part IV.A discusses the role of risk in
corporate law before and after the 2008 financial crisis and the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank Act"). 50 It argues that corporate
fiduciary duty law is sparse with respect to holding directors liable for
taking unreasonable risks. Further, the Dodd-Frank Act contains risk
Part IV.B
management provisions, but does not go far enough.5
45. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing these empirical findings in
greater detail).
46. See infra Part II.B (discussing evidence indicating that increases in diversity have been
only gradual and that corporate boards still fail to reflect U.S. demographics).
47. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (examining the correlation between gender,
race, and risk taking).
48. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 30, at 1587 ("CEOs will naturally seek boards that are as
similar as possible to themselves in all socially relevant characteristics.").
49. See infra Part W.A.
50. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); infra Part IA.
51. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, tit. 1, § 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (requiring that certain large, interconnected financial
institutions establish risk committees to oversee enterprise risk management practices); id., tit. IX,
§ 956 (requiring that certain financial institutions disclose incentive compensation management
and that corporate governance practices appropriately balance risks and rewards); infra Part IV.A
(discussing Dodd-Frank provisions related to managing company-specific and economy-wide
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discusses the corporate social responsibility literature and the idea that
stakeholders' interests may be as important a driver of corporate
decision making as shareholder value. 52 Also, it discusses the notion in
the literature on board diversity that diversity is good because it satisfies
stakeholders' interests in addition to possibly satisfying shareholders'
interests in increased share value. Board diversity is consistent with
corporate social responsibility theories and strategies. Part IV also
introduces critical race theory literature as one method to evaluate
whether worldview diversity would prove effective at helping boards
mitigate the risks of biased decision making. 53
Part V discusses three practical roadblocks to increased worldview
diversity on corporate boards. 54 In addition, it uses the insights from
research on board dynamics, and from cultural cognition and critical
race theory, to present possible strategies to overcoming those
roadblocks. 5 5 Part V concludes that increased worldview diversity on
corporate boards is achievable, and Part VI summarizes the Article. 56
President Obama stated, when signing the Dodd-Frank Act, that "[n]o
law can force anyone to be responsible."5 7 However, a combination of
law and changes in business norms may improve board decision
making. The focus of this Article is on creating incentives to encourage
directors to change business norms. Board decision making is a
function of the "competencies and [behavioral] characteristics of . . .
directors." 58 Competencies-what one can do-grow from education,
skills training, and experience. Behavioral characteristics derive from a
combination of personality-who one is-and upbringing-the
influence of external factors, including family, friends, and society.
Worldview-how one views one's role and the role of others in
society-shapes behavioral norms.

risks).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts V and VI.
Whiteboard Archives of Politico 44: A Living Diary of the Obama Presidency, POLITICO

(July 21, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/politico44/wbarchive/whiteboard07212010
.html.
58. IcHARD LEBLANC & JAMES GILLIES, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM: How BOARDS REALLY
WORK AND THE COMING REVOLUTION INCORPORATE GOVERNANCE 8 (2005).
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II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CORPORATE BOARDS
Empirical evidence suggests that an association exists between
gender and racial diversity on corporate boards and better shareholder
value. Also, diverse corporate boards' decisions are viewed with
greater legitimacy. However, empirical research also paints a different
picture: gender and racial diversity is but a small factor in valueenhancing board decisions.
A. EmpiricalResearch on the Gender and Racial Composition of
CorporateBoards
Recent statistics on board composition indicate that although gender
and racial diversity have increased on public company boards, increases
have been gradual, and corporate boards still reflect neither the
demographics of the U.S. population nor the demographics of the labor
force. 59 Moreover, boards do not reflect the percentage of the general
population holding professional degrees and qualifying for executive or
management positions. For example, according to a 2009 Catalyst
Census report of women in board positions:
In 2008, women ... held 15.2 percent of board seats.
Women's share of nominating/governance committee chairs is the
only board leadership position in which women are keeping pace with
their share of overall board seats.
In both 2008 and 2009, almost 90 percent of companies had at least
one woman director, 6 0 but less than 20 percent had three or more
women serving together.
In 2008, women of color held 3.2 percent of all board seats, and white
women held 11.8 percent.
In 2008, women of color directors comprised about two-thirds Black
women, almost one-quarter Latinas, and about one-tenth Asian
women.
In 2008 and 2009, more than one-fourth of companies had one woman
of color director, but no company had three or more women of color
directors serving together. 6 1
The Catalyst Census report further notes that 11.4 percent of board
seats in 2006 were held by minority males: 7.14 percent African
American; 1.23 percent Asian American; and 3.04 percent Hispanic. 6 2

59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. RACHEL SOARES ET AL., CATALYST, 2009 CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1 (2009).

61. Id at 2.
62.

ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 37, at 6.
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Gathering accurate board diversity statistics has proven difficult.
First, some double-counting may exist when a woman or a person of
color serves on more than one board.6 3 Second, prior to 2010, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") did not require publicly
traded companies to collect or to report information regarding board
diversity. 6 4
Effective February 28, 2010, the SEC required corporate boards of
publicly held corporations to disclose in their proxy materials more
information about how diversity factors into board member
nominations. 65 According to the SEC, the purpose of the rule was to
"provide investors with information on corporate culture and
governance practices that would enable investors to make more
informed voting and investment decisions." 6 6
Although the SEC often defines important disclosure concepts, in this
case the SEC allowed corporations to define the term "diversity"
because
companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different
perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize
diversity expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional
experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and
attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others ma
focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and national origin.6

63. See Fairfax, supra note 31, at 802 (analyzing empirical data revealing that racial
minorities tend to hold multiple directorships, while "relatively few whites hold multiple board
positions"); see also Fairfax, supra note 30, at 1116-17 ("[W]omen of color directors may hold
more multiple board seats than other directors.").
64. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44 (amending Item 407(c)(2)(vi) of
Regulation S-K to require "disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating committee
considers diversity in identifying nominees for director").
65. See id. (requiring disclosure of how diversity is considered in identifying director
nominees). The final rule states:
Describe the nominating committee's process for identifying and evaluating nominees
for director, including nominees recommended by security holders, and any differences
in the manner in which the nominating committee evaluates nominees for director
based on whether the nominee is recommended by a security holder, and whether, and
if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director. If the nominating committee (or the board) has a policy with
regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying director nominees, describe how
this policy is implemented, as well as how the nominating committee (or the board)
assesses the effectiveness of its policy.
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
66. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44. The commenters included institutional
investors Boston Club, Boston Common Asset Management, CaIPERS, Pax World Management
Corporation, Trillium Asset Management Corporation, and Social Investment Forum.
67. Id.
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The new rule does not require boards to disclose board diversity by
race, gender, etc., or to report those statistics along with the number of
other boards on which a director may serve. A recent Corporate Library
study entitled "The Value of Board Diversity: What Companies Don't
Know, But Investors Should," examined the "diversity" disclosures
from 388 of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies and found that
"companies' definitions of diversity typically lump together all kinds of
personal and professional characteristics." 68 Diversity most often was
defined in the aggregate according to gender, race, ethnicity, geography,
age, and/or professional experiences. 69 Sexual orientation, physical
disability, and socioeconomic diversity were not mentioned in any of
the disclosures. 70 In light of these varied and all-inclusive definitions,
the rule has not resolved the data collection problem described above.
However, the rule has another purpose at least as important as
improving transparency regarding diversity statistics, if not more
important. During the notice and comment period after the SEC
proposed the rule, institutional investors commented that board diversity
improves financial performance and "that diverse boards can help
companies more effectively recruit talent and retain staff."71 The
disclosures could reveal whether companies also believe that board
diversity increases shareholder value, improves recruiting and retention
of talented staff, or has some other positive impact on corporate
One may infer whether a
operations, finance, or governance.
corporation believes that diversity has a positive value by examining the
corporation's proxy statement, which discusses institutionalized
processes "through which [corporate managers] will be able to survey
the social issues facing the corporation, evaluate the corporation's
current practices, reflect on alternatives, and implement action." 72
In the Corporate Library report, Kimberly Gladman noted that
companies' disclosures were vague, fairly "boilerplate," and "notable
for what's not there." 73 Specifically, the disclosures did not address
68.

Kimberly Gladman, The Value of Board Diversity: What Companies Don't Know, but

Investors Should, CORP. LBR. BLOG (July 29, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://blog.thecorporatelibrary
.com/blog/2010/07/the-value-of-board-diversity-what-companies-dont-know-but-investorsshould.html.
69. Id.
70. Id
71. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44.
72. Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, One Nation, Indivisible:
The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency, Accountability, and Workplace
Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 409 (2005).
73. Robert Kropp, Corporate Disclosures Ignore Financial Benefits of Board Diversity,

SOCIALFUNDS (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi?sfArticleld=3007.
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issues such as efforts to recruit a diverse board and the connection
between board diversity, corporate governance, and corporate
performance.
For example, two reasons are often given for the predominance of
white males on corporate boards: lack of qualified senior executives in
the pipeline, and lack of corporate governance training of potential
diversity candidates who are female or people of color. 74 Corporate
boards strive for, and in some cases are mandated to achieve, board
independence. 75 An independent director often comes from the ranks of
senior executives outside of the company who, due to his or her
interactions with corporate boards, may have corporate governance
awareness if not actual corporate governance training. 76 In addition,
boards increasingly look for executives with experience in industries
that are or will be important to the corporations' future, not just to the
corporations' current business. Finally, due to the requirement of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") that audit committees
have at least one member who is a financial expert, corporations look
for board members with financial expertise.77 The Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements seem to have created more opportunities to serve on
corporate boards. As senior executives have resigned from board
positions because of the increased time commitment commensurate
with increased monitoring obligations due to Sarbanes-Oxley, board
positions open up. However, this benefits qualified women and people
of color who seek to become directors only if they are considered as
directors. Do these numerous qualifications-financial expertise,
industry experience, knowledge regarding corporate governance, and
independence-overly narrow the pool for board members who can
increase board gender and racial diversity?
Less diversity among senior executives means less diversity among
potential board candidates. The purported lack of female senior
74.

See Beverly Behan, Time for Diversity in the Boardroom, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK

(Jan. 20, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jan2009/ca20090120
589700.htm (discussing the factors constraining corporate board invitations to minorities).
75. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47516, 68 Fed. Reg.
14,451 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47516.htm (noting the
filing of a proposed SEC rule change regarding board independence).
76. See LEBLANC & GILLIES, supra note 58, at 51-52, 67-75.
77. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8177, 34-47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm. Section 407 required publicly traded companies to
disclose whether the audit committee has at least one financial expert on the committee. See 15
U.S.C. § 7265(a) (2002) (delegating authority to the SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley relating to
financial experts on audit committees).
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executives and senior executives of color who are board-ready begs the
question: why is there a lack of diversity among senior executives?
However, some question whether a dearth of qualified, diverse senior
executives even exists.7 8 For example, the Executive Leadership
Council ("ELC") is comprised of more than 500 African American
senior-level executives from a wide variety of industries. 79 The
executives either report directly to the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO")
or are within three levels below the CEO in the corporate hierarchy.8 0
According to the ELC and others, the issue is not a dearth of boardready diversity candidates, but that board candidates are often within the
nominating committee's or CEO's "circle of acquaintance";8 1 those
committees and acquaintanceships just do not include many qualified
women or people of color. These are issues that could be addressed in
the proxy disclosures and should inform the disclosures. 82
B. Diversity, Governance,Fairness,and Profitability
According to a post by Kimberly Gladman on the Corporate Library
blog, "Company after company claims [in proxy disclosures and in
other published material] to value diversity and says [diversity] makes
board discussions more robust and better informed. However, exactly

78. See, e.g., New Survey of Corporate Hiring: Black and Latino Executives Falling Further

Behind, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-survey(noting
of-corporate-hiring-black-and-latino-executives-falling-further-behind-89105902.html
that the poor economy in 2008-2009 cultivated this attitude among the executive search
industry). A survey examining employment rates of minority executives conducted by Wesley,
Brown & Bartle ("WB&B"), a national executive search firm, shows that "when an equally
credentialed Black or Latino executive is one of three finalists for an open position, their
respective chance of getting the job offer is not one in three but one in 33." Id. Wesley Portiotis,
chairman of WB&B, discussed his assignment experience from Fortune 500 companies where
WB&B presented over 300 highly qualified minority candidates, whom he referred to as "the
hidden talent pool of high performers." Id. The results were "less than two percent were hired in
line and operations roles that affect the company's bottom-line." Id.
79.

See Vision and Mission, EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.elcinfo.com/

mission.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) ("The mission of The Executive Leadership Council is to
build an inclusive business leadership pipeline, and to develop African-American corporate
leaders-one student and one executive at a time.").
80. Id.

8 1. Id
82. Another potential issue is the incentive to disclose vague statements regarding diversity, or
viewed another way, the lack of incentive to disclose more than the bare minimum regarding
board diversity. Disclosures could lead to litigation. If the corporation were to disclose the "lack
of candidates" argument, then shareholders could claim the statement is evidence that the
corporation did not do its homework to locate candidates. Further, if other corporations make
vague statements about diversity, then the business norm leans towards vague statements and the
corporation cannot be faulted for failure to have processes in place that are not up to standard
business practices.
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how this happens is not explained." 83 Moreover, the companies do not
describe "what difference . . . it make[s], performance-wise, to have

women and members of racial and ethnic minority groups serve on
corporate boards." 84 The disclosures do not specify the connection
between diversity and improved corporate governance or firm
performance, even though academics from law, business, and
economics investigate such a connection. 85
The disclosures mirror the results of a qualitative study conducted by
John Conley, Lissa Broome, and Kimberly Krawiec. 86 The purpose of
the study was to crystallize directors' and their advisers' rationales for
board diversity. In sum, the participants identified a variety of
rationales: firms seeking board diversity are accessing an untapped
talent pool; 87 a diverse board gets to a better answer;8 8 diverse boards
are more likely to engage in constructive dissent; 89 a diverse board
conveys a credible signal to relevant observers of corporate behavior;90
and board diversity is accepted without much introspection. 9 1 In the
83.

Gladman, supra note 68.

84. Id.
85. See David A. Carter et al., Board Diversity and Firm Performance, in 17 RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & FINANCE 49, 51-55 (Jonathan A. Batten et al. eds., 2003)

(examining the relationship between board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms);
David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33,

37 (2003) (discussing the link between diversity and firm value); David Carter et al., The Gender
and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm FinancialPerformance, 18
CORP. Gov.: AN INT'L REV. 396, 398-400 (2010) [hereinafter Carter et al., Gender and Ethnic
Diversity] (discussing the benefits of including women and ethnic minorities on boards of
directors); CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN'S
REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS I (2007) (discussing the success of financial measures when
women serve on boards); CORPORATE LIBRARY, BEYOND THE BOILERPLATE: THE
PERFORMANCE IMPACTS OF BOARD DIVERSITY 6 (2010), available at http://www
(discussing
.thecorporatelibrary.com/product documents/327boarddiversitydisclosures.pdf
potential consequences of women board directors). See generally Deborah Rhode & Amanda K.
Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Diference Does Difference Make? 4-9
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 89, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1685615 (summarizing the recent empirical
literature on the relationship between board diversity and corporate performance).
86. John M. Conley, Lissa L. Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiece, Narratives of Diversity in the
CorporateBoardroom: What CorporateInsiders Say About Why Diversity Matters 10-23 (Univ.

of N.C. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 1415803, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1415803#%23.
87. See id at 12 (discussing diversity in relation to board succession planning).
88. See id. at II (noting that a diverse board will better appreciate differing viewpoints based
on race, economic status, or industry background).

89. See id. at 3 (discussing the rationale for board diversity).
90. See id. at 19 (stating that test subjects indicated that board composition sends "positive
signals about the company to particular groups").
91. See id at 24 (relating the viewpoint of one test subject that "you're never going to have a
board that will honestly question whether or not there is a value associated with [diversity]").
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study, the interviewees told a story that "amount[ed] to little more than
'[diversity] seems like a good thing to do."' 92 In sum, none identified
the benefits of diversity with concrete details. 93
Calls for greater diversity often are motivated by two concerns. 94
First, greater diversity may lead to improved shareholder value. 95
Second, greater diversity is better from a fairness point of view-that is,
diversity would lead to more role models who serve as examples of
what historically disempowered people may achieve; to corporations
that play a bigger role in the society at large; to corporations that have a
better sense of the markets they serve; or to a more egalitarian
workforce. 96
Empirical evidence suggests that gender and racial diversity may go
towards achieving both of these goals.9 7 First, "a survey conducted in
1997 identified fifty-one studies that had tested for a correlation
between a corporation's social performance and the [corporation's]
financial performance." 98 "Although the results of these studies are
mixed, the authors of the review report 'good news', observing that 'the
largest number of researchers has found a positive relationship.' 99
Studies that are more recent have indicated either a positive or a neutral
relationship between gender and racial diversity and firm
performance.' 00 For example, a recent study conducted by Carter et al.
92. Id.
93. See id (concluding that research showed little evidence of a "master narrative" of board
diversity).
94. See, e.g., Fairfax,supra note 31, at 798-800 (discussing risks inherent in shifting diversity
justifications from moral and social rationales to economics-based rationales).
95. See id.
96. See Melissa Murray & Darren Rosenblum, On Equity in Economic Stimulus: Should Job

Creation Favor Men?, S.F. CHRON. (May 19, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-19/
opinion/17202600 I_gi-higher-education-jobs (arguing that policymakers must develop solutions
"to protect both men and women from future economic uncertainty").
97. Several methodological issues exist with respect to empirical studies that seek to
determine whether diversity is good for a company. First, the number of female directors and
directors of color is relatively small. Second, researchers take care to distinguish between a
connection between diversity and shareholder value versus diversity as the source of the effect on
corporate performance. In other words, diversity causes better performance. Third, even if a
causal link between diversity and performance were established, it would not be certain that
diversity caused better performance, as opposed to the other way around-better performing
boards also seek diverse candidates.
98. Mehri et al., supra note 72, at 411.
99. Id. (quoting Jennifer J. Griffen & John F. Mahon, The CorporateSocial Performanceand
Corporate FinancialPerformance Debate: Twenty-Five Years of Incomparable Research, 36

Bus. & SOC'Y 5, 6-7 (1997)).
100. See Carter et al., Gender and Ethnic Diversity, supra note 85, at 399 (summarizing the

empirical studies linking board diversity and firm financial performance). Many of these studies
use Tobin's Q as a measure of corporate performance. See, e.g., Larry H. P. Lang & Ren6 M.
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"suggests that the interaction of gender diversity and ethnic minority
diversity do not impact financial performance."l 0
However, the picture of the interaction between diversity and
corporate performance is more complex than suggested above. Other
studies have found that gender diversity improves corporate monitoring
as measured by board member attendance records. 102 For example, a
2008 study by Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira found that "female
directors have better attendance records than male directors, male
directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the
board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees."1 03
Adams and Ferreira suggested that "gender-diverse boards allocate
more effort to monitoring." 04 In addition, among the companies
studied, "[CEO] turnover is more sensitive to stock performance and
directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more
gender-diverse boards." This suggested closer board monitoring of
management performance. Moreover, the authors concluded that
gender diversity led to negative financial performance in firms with
fewer takeover defenses, and that "mandating gender quotas for
directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms."10 5 Genderdiverse boards may lead to lower takeover premiums for shareholders of
target companies with weaker takeover defenses. 106
However, other studies have revealed different factors at play that
contribute to demonstrated negative effects of board diversity. A 2003
study by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick found that "firms with stronger
shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profit, higher sales
growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate

Stulz, Tobin's Q, Corporate Diversifications, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248
(1994) (describing that Tobin's Q is a measure of market value versus the replacement cost of the
company's assets).
101.

Carter et al., Gender and Ethnic Diversity, supra note 85, at 396.

102. See Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 291 (2009) (discussing attendance records

and board diversity); Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minquez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICs 435, 440 (2008) (discussing

how the gender composition of the board can affect the quality of a director's monitoring role);
Luis Rodriguez-Dominguez, Isabel-Maria Garcia-Sinchez & Isabel Gallego-Alvarez,
Explanatory Factors of the RelationshipBetween Gender Diversity and Corporate Performance,

EUR. J.L. & ECON., March 2010 (discussing how women achieve better performance in sectors
traditionally dominated by men when working conditions and academic background are similar).
103. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 102, at 291.
104. Id.
105. Id.

106. Id.
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acquisitions." 107 In other words, weak takeover defenses translated into
higher shareholder value. Two explanations are suggested. First,
companies with stronger takeover defenses are not as likely to be
acquired; a takeover premium is less likely, and thus in the aggregate,
companies with stronger takeover defenses have lower market
values.108 By contrast, buyers typically pay more for companies with
fewer takeover defenses (i.e., strong shareholder rights) than the market
value of the company right before the takeover bid. 109
Second, weaker takeover defenses indicate that management is
disciplined either by the external market for takeovers or by internal
governance structures, such as strong shareholder rights or monitoring
boards of directors. 10 Thus, companies with weak takeover defenses
would have stronger shareholder rights, more effective board
monitoring, or be acquired.'"
Although board gender diversity may lead to over-monitoring (and
thus lower takeover premiums) at companies with weaker takeover
defenses, it may be "the stronger monitoring practices of diverse boards
that lead to more efficient value discovery,"1 1 2 i.e., lower takeover
premiums. Or, it may be that women on gender-diverse boards have "a
more realistic sense of corporate value." 1l 3 While gender-diverse
boards may
have a detrimental effect on the short-term returns to shareholders of
target companies[,] . . . they would have a positive effect on the

potential acquirers, the shareholders of the surviving entity, and any
portfolios that hold all of the stocks concerned. Diversity, then, may
be a tool that helps focus companies on the creation of economic

107. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,

118 Q.J. EcoNoMics 107, 134-35 (2003).
108. See CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 85, at 6. Shareholders of a company with fewer
takeover defenses are likely to receive a takeover premium more often than shareholders of a
company with stronger takeover defenses. Id. A greater likelihood of a takeover premium may
translate into higher stock prices.
109. See id. (suggesting the strength of shareholder rights in companies with weak takeover
defenses has a disciplining effect on managers as those managers are "less likely to subordinate
shareholder rights to their own").
110. See id. (highlighting that market forces driven by high "takeover premiums," i.e., the
difference between pre- and post-acquisition stock values, attract shareholders to companies with
weak takeover defenses).
111. See id. (noting the conflict between the positives of weak takeover defenses and strong
shareholder rights, and the lack of diversity on the boards of these companies).
112. Id.
113. Id
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value, not the realization of short-term gains that come at others'
expense, in a zero-sum game. 114
Board diversity may have an impact on communities as well as on
markets. A diversity candidate may view decisions with an eye towards
the potential impact on stakeholders as well as on shareholders.11 5 As
one bank director stated:
[Bank boards are] social institutions of cities and towns of various
sizes and there are strengths to that and there are weaknesses. The
strengths are that you have cohesion and a certain sense of reflecting
broadly held values of the community. The weakness is that you
don't-boards can become . . . hidebound, inbred, and can fail to take
into account changes that are going on in their communities. Plus, in
the case of women, I have tried to point out to banks that more than
half the people in their markets are women .

. .

. It's sensible to me

that you would want to have someone who is a working woman on a
board, at least one, to point out to the rest of the board what it's likewhat the life of. . . many of their employees is like. 1 16
The empirical research on factors affecting corporate boards such as
decision making, group dynamics, organizational culture, and
communications styles is evolving. Also, the research on board
diversity's business case is becoming more sophisticated. One point is
apparent from the recent proxy disclosures and from qualitative
interviews with directors: it is not too late for the research to further
inform directors' thinking regarding diversity in the boardroom.
III. RESEARCH ON THE THEORY OF CULTURAL COGNITION

It may be that a board reflective of a variety of worldviews is the
difference between those boards that appear diverse in terms of race and
gender but do not achieve the expected gains in terms of shareholder
value or in corporate governance, and those that do. Many factors could
be at play. This section discusses the research on cultural cognition,
risk perception, and decision making, which all may indicate whether
that variety in worldview exists.

114. Id.
115. See Conley et al., supra note 86, at 19-20 (noting that some of the research subjects saw
diverse boards that were representative of various groups, such as shareholders, employees, and
customers, as a way to send positive signals about the company to those groups-a concept also
known as the "signaling theory").
116. Id. at 20.

2011]

Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom

607

A. CulturalCognition Theory and EmpiricalResearch

Social science researchers have investigated why the public holds
certain opinions about the risks posed by socially-charged activities,
such as gun ownership, climate change, marijuana use, nuclear power,
nanotechnology, and abortion, in order to better understand how factors
such as personal characteristics (e.g., race, gender, and age), cultural
influences, and values impact public discourse about hotly debated
social issues.117 Another goal of the research is to arrive at public
policy methods of achieving democratic and creative resolutions to
these issues. 118 Individuals' perception of the riskiness of these
117.

See generally, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY

(1994) (discussing the advent of an anthropological theory that explains the human need to
transfer blame for disaster onto unpopular groups or classes); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1983) (discussing the influence of perceived societal risks on the
political debate to determine which risks are "acceptable"); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining the statistical
relationship between discrete lethal events and the socially perceived risk that follows); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005) (highlighting the

manner in which feelings of fear and paranoia accompanying disaster and crime spread through
society like "wildfire" following a particular event); Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000)
(explaining the relationship between cognitive stress and risk perception); H616ne Joffe, Risk:
From Perceptionto Social Representation, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 55 (2003) (discussing the
problems with assumptions made by risk perception approaches); Kahan et al., Culture and
Identity, supra note 38, at 466 (suggesting the "white male effect" leads white males to fear risk
less than women and minorities because of "a congeniality between hierarchical and
individualistic worldviews, on the one hand, and a posture of extreme risk skepticism, on the
other"); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 838, 849 (2009) (detailing a study that
displayed marked differences in perceptions among different demographics who viewed a highspeed police chase video from the criminal case Scott v. Harris); R.W. Rogers, Protection
Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals and Attitude Change, 91 J. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1975)
(proposing a protection motivation theory suggesting that components of fear can create an
attitude change); Irwin M. Rosenstock, HistoricalOrigins of the Health Belief Model, 2 HEALTH
EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 328 (1974) (describing the Health Belief Model, which predicts the
likelihood of a person undertaking a recommended health action by evaluation demographic
variables, various perceptions, and modifying factors); R. Schwarzer, Self-Efficacy in the
Adoption and Maintenance of Health Behaviors: Theoretical Approaches and a New Model, in
SELF-EFFICACY: THOUGHT CONTROL OF ACTION 217 (R. Schwarzer ed., 1992); Paul Slovic et
al., Rating the Risks, in PERCEPTION OF RISK 1101 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (discussing the role of

heuristics in risk perception in the public arena); Kahan et al., Second National Risk, supra note
38, at 2 (describing a series of reports and surveys designed to test the "'cultural cognition thesis'

which asserts that people's beliefs about risk are shaped by their core values").
118. See Joffe, supra note 117, at 55 (challenging the "perception approaches" that dominate
the psychology of risk by suggesting that the "social representation theory" is more accurate);
Kahan et al., supra note 117, at 903-04 (concluding that the Scott v. Harris study depicts a
cultural division in society that affects not only jury verdicts but also public sentiment for a range
of social policy issues, such as vaccination, gun control, and climate change); Kahan et al.,
Second National Risk, supra note 38, at 15 (suggesting that political breakdowns in American
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activities is skewed-risk perception is biased. Conflict can interfere
with finding resolutions to social problems that most people would
agree need to be resolved, but that evoke significant disagreement over
the means to achieve resolution.
Researchers have tested various hypotheses to determine the
mechanisms operating to create risk misperception. A variety of
empirical and survey-based attitudinal research at the Yale Cultural
Cognition Project ("Cultural Cognition Project") tests the "cultural
cognition hypothesis" and investigates the mechanisms that underlie the
operation of cultural cognition in risk perception. 1 19 The cultural
cognition hypothesis seeks to explain the variance in individuals' risk
sensitivity. The cultural cognition hypothesis states that "values are
prior to fact in disputed issues of risk . . .- not just in the moral sensebut in the cognitive sense, in that our values shape our understandings
of what risks are real and significant as opposed to contrived and
overblown."1 20 Individuals tend to conform their beliefs to their
values. 121 Thus, risk perception would be most strongly correlated with
worldviews and not with personal characteristics.
Using a typology credited to Mary Douglas, an anthropologist, and
Aaron Wildavsky, a cultural theorist who studied group cultures, the
Yale researchers have conducted a number of studies to test the
hypothesis that cultural worldviews, i.e., individuals' views of the "ideal
society," explain the variance among individuals' perceptions of risk,
despite the availability of facts regarding those risks. 12 2 In the Douglas
and Wildavsky typology, four worldviews exist: communitarian,
individualist, egalitarian, and hierarchist. 123 For example, people who
hold relatively individualistic and hierarchical values are inclined to
disbelieve the seriousness of environmental risks and disfavor
environmental regulation because such regulation threatens their beliefs

democratic society play a role in the perception of risk).
119.

See generally WALTER INST.: THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH.,

http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (describing research studies and
projects, including studies of perception of risks inherent in nanotechnology, gun ownership,
HPV vaccines, environmental pollution, and how cultural cognition operates).
120. Dan Kahan, The Cultural Cognition of Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications,
WALTER INST.: THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH. (Oct. 8, 2009),

http://mediasite.video.ufl.edu/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=el6374d0980344fa911266bf40b60 314.
121. Id.
122. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear ofDemocracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119
HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1072 (2006).
123. See Mary Douglas, A History of Grid and Group Cultural Theory, available at http://
projects.chass.utoronto.ca/semiotics/cyber/douglas l.pdf (discussing the contributions of
Wildavsky and other theoreticians to the group and grid cultural theory).
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about enterprise and commerce. 124 On the other hand, individuals who
subscribe to egalitarian beliefs may be more ready to credit the
seriousness of environmental risks and favor environmental regulation
because commerce represents values inconsistent and threatening to
their own beliefs. 12 5
A number of studies have shown that an individual's values, as
represented by that individual's worldview, "strongly predict that
person's attitudes towards a wide range of societal risks."1 26 One
Cultural Cognition Project study investigated whether worldviews, or
personal characteristics, were more predictive of whether an individual
would favor or oppose gun control. 12 7 The researchers hypothesized:
[T]he association of guns with traditional gender roles and with state
authority should make gun control anathema to individuals of a
relatively hierarchical orientation. Those of an egalitarian orientation,
in contrast, should support gun control as a means of affirming gender
and racial equality. Persons of a relatively individualist orientation
should oppose gun control, which they are likely to see as denigrating
the ideal of individual self-reliance. By the same token, individuals
who are less inclined toward individualism should favor gun control in
order to express trust in, solidarity with, and collective responsibility
for the well-being of, their fellow citizens. 128
The research results were consistent with the four research hypotheses:
[T]he more egalitarian and solidaristic [i.e., communitarian] an
individual's worldview, the more likely that person was to support gun
control; likewise, the more hierarchical and individualistic the
respondent's worldview, the more likely he or she was to oppose gun
control.
Indeed, among individuals of divergent orientations, the contrast in
attitudes toward gun control was stark. Thus, individuals who were
relatively hierarchical in their outlooks were nearly twice as likely as
those who were relatively egalitarian, and individuals who were
relatively individualistic over four times as likely as individuals who

124. See Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1298 (2003) (noting that while
individualists and hierarchists tend to perceive environmental risks from commerce as low, they
perceive different risks as high, namely "the dangers of social deviance, the risks of foreign
invasion, and the fragility of economic institutions").
125. See id. ("[I]ndividuals of an egalitarian orientation are predictably sensitive to
environmental and industrial risks, the minimization of which licenses the regulation of
commercial activities productive of disparities in wealth and status.").
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1302-05 (describing the researchers' study of the perceptions of different social
groups on gun control).
128. Id at 1302.
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were relatively solidaristic [i.e., communitarian], to oppose gun
control. 129
Moreover, the researchers found that worldviews-as opposed to any
other characteristic-were more predictive of attitudes towards gun
control. 130 However, women, regardless of their cultural orientation,
were more likely to favor gun control than men. This finding regarding
gender was consistent with common assertions "that women are more
concerned with risks of all types." 131
A subsequent survey delved further into the combined influence of
gender, race, and worldviews on risk perception. 13 2 This study
investigated an observed phenomenon known as the "white male
effect," which has drawn researchers' attention. 133 The phrase refers to
empirical evidence showing that the risk perceptions of a certain group
of white males were more skewed than the risk perceptions of females
and persons of color. 134 The researchers proposed that "variance in risk
perceptions-across people generally, and across race and gender in
particular-reflects a form of motivated cognition through which people
seek to deflect threats to identities they hold, and roles they occupy, by
virtue of contested cultural norms."1 35 The term "cultural-identityprotective cognition" describes this cognitive process.136
The researchers formed two hypotheses to investigate whether
cultural-identity-protective cognition might motivate differences in risk
perception across gender and race:
First, individuals holding differing worldviews should disagree with
one another when their respective norms clash on the value of a
putatively dangerous activity. And second, individuals sharing a
cultural worldview should diverge along gender or race lines when

129. Id. at 1306-07.
130. Id. at 1307.
131. Id. at 1309.
132. See Kahan et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 466 (stating the study was
designed to test the hypothesis that "the white-male effect might derive from a congeniality
between hierarchical and individualistic worldviews, on the one hand, and a posture of extreme
risk skepticism, on the other").
133. See id. at 465-67.
134. See id. at 465 (noting the white male effect, which is the theory that "white men fear
various risks less than women and minorities," is "well documented, but poorly understood").
135. Id. at 467.
136. Id. at 472 (stating that instead of individuals wanting to belong to a group, e.g., 4-H or a
church community, individuals want to belong to the group in society that holds the same values
that the individual holds); see also Burch, supra note 34, at 514 (describing how cultural-identityprotective cognition might impact board decision making).
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their shared norms feature gender or race differentiation with respect
to social roles involving such an activity. 137
For example, "the social roles that guns enable and the virtues they
symbolize are stereotypically male roles and virtues" and gun
ownership historically was a white prerogative and a "symbol of white
male status."" Thus, "it is individualistic and hierarchical white males
whose identities are threatened most by regulation of guns and who
should therefore form the most skeptical attitude about asserted gun
risks."1 3 9 Individualistic and hierarchical females and people of color
should have less skepticism about gun risks "because they have less of
an identity investment in guns being freely available."1 40 Finally,
"[b]ecause egalitarianism and communitarianism don't tie antipathy to
guns to race and gender roles, those worldviews should uniformly
incline whites and minorities, men and women, toward gun-risk
sensitivity."141
The results of the study strongly suggested that the "white male
effect" was due not simply to the influence of worldviews, but to how
cultural artifacts related to race and gender may operate to amplify risk
sensitivity and "risk skepticism."1 4 2 Of course, women and people of
color also displayed risk misperceptions, as well as egalitarians and
communitarians. 143
What are the mechanisms connecting worldviews to risk perceptions?
The Yale researchers investigated three mechanisms: culturally-biased
assimilation/polarization, the cultural credibility heuristic, and identityprotective cognition. 144

137.
138.
Kahan
139.

Kahan et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 473.
Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, 21 AM. HERITAGE 4 (1970), quoted in
et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 475.
Kahan et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 475.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142.

Id. at 465.

143. See id at 498 (explaining that the dynamics that contribute to skewed risk perceptions
within the four specific worldviews are similar to the dynamics that contribute to risk perception
in women and minorities).
144. Kahan, supra note 120. See generally Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition Project,
WALTER INST.: THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH. (June 25, 2009, 3:16 PM),

http://www.culturalcognition.net/projects/mechanisms-of-cultural-cognition.html (describing the
focus of the project as identifying the social and cognitive processes through which values shape
risk perceptions and other factual beliefs); Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine,
Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34

LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 514 (2010) (noting that a study confirmed that discrepancies in risk
perception associated with HPV vaccination varied greatly between those who held hierarchist
and individualist worldviews, and those who held egalitarian and communitarian worldviews).
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Culturally-biased assimilation/polarization refers to the fact that
individuals process information in a biased way that reinforces their
prior predisposition.14 5 Exposure to information has no uniform effect
on people's perceptions on risk. 146 Information causes people to
become more polarized in their views.147 Also, cultural disposition may
cause people to seek information (prior knowledge) and then construe it
in a way that conforms to their cultural disposition.148
Second, the cultural credibility heuristic states that people determine
their views based on the views of others who have similar cultural
dispositions.1 4 9 Trust in experts is conditioned on whether the experts
share their worldviews.1 s0 Individuals may credit or discredit factual
information related to politically- and socially-charged subjects
depending on whether the information accords with their own value
set.' 5 1 In addition, whether an individual perceives the person
presenting the data as holding values consistent with the individual's
values influences the individual's perception of the legitimacy of
data. 152
Third, cultural-identity-protective cognition, discussed above, asserts
that it threatens people to think that the conduct they value harms others
in society or to think that the conduct they despise is beneficial to others
in society.1 53 Because of cognitive dissonance, individuals would tend

145. Kahan et al., supra note 144, at 504 (defining "biased assimilation" as "the tendency of
individuals selectively to credit and dismiss information in a manner that confirms their prior
beliefs").
146. See id. at 509 (noting differences in risk perception depend on the amount of information
the subject receives, but also on other factors, such as predisposed worldviews).
147. See id. at 504 ("[P]eople will selectively credit or discredit information on risk in a
manner that fits their cultural predispositions toward them, and thus polarize along cultural lines
148. Id.
149. See id. at 509 ("[C]ultural affinity and cultural difference supply the relevant ingroup/out-groups references that in turn determine whom people see as knowledgeable, honest,
and unbiased. . . .").
150. See id (explaining that credibility heuristic allows individuals to determine whom is
"worthy of being credited in debates about risk").
151. See id at 502 (arguing that theories focusing only on heuristic reasoning fail to account
for "political conflict" and disagreement over a range of personal and societal risks).
152. See id at 512 ("[A] deliberative climate is likely to emerge in which culturally diverse
members of the public consistently see advocates they identify with presenting arguments they
are already predisposed to accept . . . .").
153. See Kahan et al., Second NationalRisk, supra note 38, at 5 (explaining that in "identityprotective cognition," in order to "avoid[] dissonance and estrangement from valued groups,
individuals subconsciously resist factual information that threatenstheir defining values").
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to dismiss information that might conflict with their views of the values

they hold. 15 4
Positive, normative, and prescriptive implications arise from the
studies of cultural cognition and the mechanisms underlying cultural
cognition. First, a positive implication is that getting the word out will
not necessarily quell bias. 155 In other words, educating individuals
about the facts will not lead necessarily to a change in viewpoint.' 56
Second, a normative implication is that not all risk variation is risk bias
to be mitigated. "If fact and value are intertwined, then cultural
cognition is not bias-it is moral perception." 57 Third, a prescriptive
implication is that policy makers should engage in "deliberative
debiasing strategies-identify risk delivery strategies in a way that
reduces the motivation to resist the information."1 58
B. Critiques

Critiques of cultural cognition theory should be recognized before
examining the theory's implications for board diversity. Some critiques
are aimed at the studies' methodologies. For example, the studies
measure attitudes and not behavior or factors other than cultural
cognition that may impact behavior. 159 The goal of the Cultural
Cognition Project is to devise strategies to resolve contentious policy
disputes-in other words, to effect changes in attitudes and in behavior.
Although attitudes should drive behavior, other factors beyond the
scope of the studies may also influence behavior.
Another criticism is that the variance in risk perception is not
explained entirely by worldviews and/or converging worldviews and

154. See id.at 16 ("When policies are framed in ways that affirm rather than threaten citizens'
cultural values, people are less likely to dismiss information that runs contrary to their prior
beliefs."); see also Dan Kahan, Nuclear Power Makes IndividualsSee Green, SITUATIONIST (Oct.

2, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2007/10/02/nuclear-power-makesindividualists-see-green/ (applying the "cultural cognition of risk" theory to explain
individualists' perceptions of the risks and benefits of nuclear power).
155. See Kahan et al., supra note 144, at 512-14 (noting individual values must also be taken
into account in order to explain how information can adjust risk perception in different societal
groups).
156. See id. (suggesting that in order to persuade individuals to alter their perception of risk,
the targeted individual must also share the values or worldviews of the expert presenting the
information).
157. Kahan, supra note 120.
158. Id
159. But see Kahan et al., supra note 144, at 513 (discussing a study that found the impact of
cultural cognition to be relatively small, as subjects observed persons of diverse values on both
sides of a debate).

614

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

status in society based on cultural artifacts related to gender and race. 160
However, although cultural cognition does not explain all of the bias, it
explains and quantifies a significant portion of the bias.
Another question is whether worldviews are stable; i.e., whether
people are always egalitarians, or whether they are egalitarians on only
some issues and individualists on others. At bottom, worldviews are
usually stable; attitudes and values are slow to change over time. 16 1
A larger question posed by Cass Sunstein is whether cultural
cognition is a result of bounded rationality, a concept stating that
rational people use heuristics-or mental shortcuts-when acting to
maximize their best interests or expected utility.162 The response to this
criticism is that risk misperception originates in conflicting values, not
in peoples' need to resort to heuristics to process information. 163
In sum, though the above criticisms are aimed at cultural cognition
theory, the theory will still prove useful in illustrating the potential
effects of worldview diversity on corporate boards, and in suggesting
methods of introducing and managing diversity and bias in the
boardroom.
IV. DIVERSITY FOR EQUITY AND FAIRNESS
The Cultural Cognition Project may add detail to our understanding
of the nature of the cultural bonds shared among corporate directors.
The Project points to evidence of the impact of bias on decision making
specifically as it relates to directors' evaluation of risk. These studies
demonstrate that cultural cognition-the board members' views of the
ideal society-along with competencies and behavioral characteristics
are important factors in board decision making. Cultural cognition
aligned with moral values is not biased thinking; board members'
decisions should be informed by moral values. But moral values may
not be aligned with the best interests of shareholders or society in
general. Convergence of the cultural cognition theory, corporate social
responsibility, and critical race theory may shed new light on the value
160. See Kahan et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 482.
161. See, e.g., K.C. Calman, Evolutionary Ethics: Can Values Change, 30 J. MED. ETHICS

366, 366-70 (2004) (testing the hypothesis that values in the medical profession change and
evolve over time).
162. See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1110, 1110-12 (2006)
("'[C]ultural cognition' is largely a result of bounded rationality, not an alternative to it.").
163. See Kahan & Slovic, supra note 42, at 169-72 ("[M]any of the public (mis)perceptions
of risk that Sunstein attributes to bounded rationality in fact express coherent cultural worldviews,
and as such must be taken seriously in any policymaking scheme that purports to be
democratic.").
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of board diversity in a broad sense and on strategies to achieve
diversity.
The research points to several implications regarding boards of
directors and diversity on boards. First, these studies lend support to the
notion that intentional racial discrimination on corporate boards is not
the main issue. Instead, "racial homogeneity [on corporate boards]
exists with little overt racial discrimination and few violations of
antidiscrimination law. Indeed, it appears far more likely that board
members are chosen based upon cultural proximity to CEOs rather than
color."1 64 Also, the research lends support to the notion that gender and
racial diversity may increase worldview diversity, but the better way to
achieve worldview diversity is to seek board diversity in terms of board
members' worldviews, rather than trying to achieve worldview diversity
by using gender and racial diversity as a proxy for worldview
diversity. 165
In "The Myth of the Unbiased Director," I hypothesize that
individual board members' values and worldviews influence their risk
perceptions. 166 Further, I hypothesize that the majority of corporate
boards are composed of directors whose values reflect predominantly
hierarchical and individualistic worldviews. 167 Moreover, board
perception of risks may be impacted by risk perception bias due to the
predominance of hierarchical and individualistic worldviews on
boards. 168
A. The ChangingRole ofRisk in CorporateLaw

Although as a practical matter, boards rely on the CEO and
management for pointers on decisions and guidance on the board's
monitoring duties, ultimately corporate directors, acting as a board, are
legally responsible for control of corporate assets and oversight of
corporate activities. 169 Moreover, post-Sarbanes-Oxley, boards have
paid more attention to governance matters.
164. Ramirez, supra note 30, at 1584.
165. Race and gender alone do not account for an individual's worldview. For example, an
African American male director may hold hierarchical and individualistic worldviews.
166. See generally Burch, supra note 34 (discussing why problems in corporate governance
continue despite reforms).
167. See id. at 513 (discussing the effect of board members' behavioral characteristics on the
decision-making process).
168. See id. at 514 (suggesting that boards of directors take steps to ensure diversity of
worldviews).
169. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 2010) ("[The business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
direction of the board. The board may delegate the management of the day-to-day operation of

616

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

Corporate boards greatly influence the health and wealth of the global
economy. Corporate boards determine whether corporations merge or
sell off assets, relocate within or outside of the United States, invest in
research and development, divest product lines, or hire or lay off
employees, and whether and to whom to make political campaign
contributions. To provide some perspective on the influence of board
members on the health and welfare of economic markets, in July 2010,
the market capitalization1 70 of corporations publicly traded on U.S.
stock exchanges accounted for $11.794 trillion, while total global
market capitalization was around $44 trillion. 171 In other words,
publicly traded U.S. corporations comprised approximately 27 percent
of global market capitalization.172 Investment in the securities of such
corporations accounted for approximately "[45] percent of the value of
equities traded worldwide." 73 Clearly, the economic health of U.S.
publicly traded corporations is essential to the smooth functioning of the
U.S. economy, if not the world economy. Thus, directors' decisionsnot just CEOs' and CFOs' decisions-are critically important.
As a result of the accounting scandals of 2002, federal legislators
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley. 174 Sarbanes-Oxley gave the SEC the power to
require more independence on corporate boards and board committees,
in the hope that independence would lead to better oversight of
the business of the corporation to a management company or other person provided that the
business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be
exercised under the ultimate direction of the board."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West
2010) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ."); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01
(2005) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of
directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight of its board of directors .... ).
170. Market capitalization is a measure of how much money is invested in a particular firm
and is based on the number of shares of a firm multiplied by the share price. For example, a firm
with 100 shares total in the hands of its investors, each share worth $10, has a market
capitalization of $1,000.
171.

WORLD FED'N OF EXCHANGES, MARKET HIGHLIGHTS FOR FIRST HALF-YEAR 2010

(July 2010), http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/stats%20and%20charts/July/
%20WFE%2OMarket%2OHighlights.pdf.
172. Twenty-seven percent was calculated by dividing U.S. GDP by global GDP.
173.

202010

GLENN YAGO ET AL., MILKEN INST., HOME BIAS INGLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: WHAT

IS THE POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR U.S. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES? 1 (2006), available at http://

www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/publications.taffunction=detail&ID=565&cat-resrep;
Rick Newman, Five Reasons Foreign Money Boosts the U.S. Economy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP. (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/blogs/flowchart/2008/1/11/five-reasons-foreignmoney-boosts-the-us-economy.html.
174. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (providing significant changes to the regulation of
financial practices and corporate governance).
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accounting matters and better corporate governance.175
Also,
subsequent regulations required more disclosure of executive
compensation information with the hope that more disclosure would
lead to more thoughtful and justifiable compensation practices. 176
After the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, the Standard & Poor's
index of the top 500 publicly traded companies fell by 39 percent, the
worst year on record since 1934.177 The collapse of the housing price
bubble, the existence of a shadow banking system, and the overuse of
leverage among publicly traded financial institutions engaged in the
credit derivatives and subprime mortgage markets, among other factors,
contributed to a worldwide economic recession from which global
financial markets are still recovering.' 78 Congress again focused on
corporate governance structures as one factor contributing to the
financial crisis. 179 Also, regulators questioned whether financial
institution executives understood the systemic risk posed by the large
market in debt-financed derivative instruments.1 80 The Dodd-Frank Act
contains corporate governance provisions designed to empower

175. See id § 301 (establishing public company audit committees); Standards Relating to
Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC Docket (CCH)
2876 (Apr. 9, 2003) (providing that national securities exchanges and national securities
associations must comply with the requirements of the statute).
176. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178 (Apr. 4, 2011) (implementing Dodd-Frank's
provisions related to shareholder say-on-pay); Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44
(requiring disclosures related to stock options, compensation policies, and compensation
consultants); Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
33-8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 34-54302A, Investment Act Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed.
Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (overhauling executive compensation disclosures in proxy statements
and annual reports).
177.

Jim's Finance and Investments, Historical Annual Returns for the S&P 500 Index,

ISTOCKANALYST
3331526.

(July 4,

2009), http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/

178. See Juscelino F. Colares, Global Imbalances and Liquidity-InducedBubbles: Reflections
on the Great Recession and the Needfor InternationalMonetary Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV.

603, 603-06 (2010) (discussing the liquidity bubble as one factor in the Great Recession); Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting FinancialCrisis:Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the
Casefor a Systemic Emergency InsuranceFund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 152 (2011) (proposing

that all large financial firms, including hedge funds and mutual funds, should pay into an
insurance fund to protect against systemic risk in the shadow banking system).
179. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S.,
CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, at xviii-xix (2011), available at http://

cO I 82732.cdnl.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fcic finalreportconclusions.pdf (concluding that
failures of corporate governance and risk management, among other matters, contributed to the
Great Recession).
180. See id.
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investors. 18 1 In addition, it contains provisions designed to manage
business-specific and economy-wide risks. 18 2
The Dodd-Frank Act requires certain publicly traded financial
institutions to establish board-level risk committees "in order to prevent
or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States that could
arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities,
of large, inter-connected financial institutions."1 8 3 Prior to the DoddFrank Act, the SEC increasingly focused on the board's role in risk
management. For example, in 2009, the SEC mandated disclosure of
"the board's role in the oversight of risk." 184 One purpose of the
disclosure is to "provide important information to investors about how a
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing the
company." 85 However, given the homogeneous makeup of most
boards, the risk provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act and in the 2009 SEC
release may have little or no effect on a board's evaluation of the credit,
liquidity, operational, and other material risks a company faces. 186
First, hierarchical, individualistic board members may resist the
disclosure mandate if the provision is perceived as an indictment of
board members' risk assessment practices. In the release describing the
risk disclosures, the SEC stated, "We were persuaded by commenters
who noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board. ... "
Second, the predisposition heuristic could further polarize board
members who may blame financial companies, mortgage brokers, the
government, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and unscrupulous homebuyers
for the current economic woes. Finally, the provision lacks specificity

181. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-900 (2010)
(providing shareholders a non-binding vote on executive compensation); id. § 952 (requiring
independent compensation committees); id. § 953 (providing enhanced disclosures regarding
executive compensation policies, including pay versus performance); id. § 954 (providing for
executive compensation clawback), id. § 971 (providing for shareholder nominations); id. § 972
(providing for disclosures regarding whether the same individual holds both the chief executive
officer and board chair positions); id. § 989G (addressing small business issuer exemption from
Sarbanes-Oxley § 404(b)).
182. See, e.g., id. Title I.A. (establishing a risk oversight council); id Title II (creating a
resolution regime for too-big-to-fail firms).
183. See id § 165 (Enhanced Supervision and Prudential Standards for Nonbank Financial
Companies Supervised by the Board of Governors and Certain Bank Holding Companies).
184. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44, at 7.
185. Id. at 44.
186. See supra Part II.A (discussing the lack of gender and racial diversity on boards of
directors).
187. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 44, at 44.
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and may lead to the boilerplate statements that characterize the recent
board diversity disclosures.
Risk plays a critical role in corporate fiduciary duty law at the state
level. Corporate directors are rarely held liable for breach of the
fiduciary duty of care. Courts are reluctant to second-guess directors'
evaluations of the risks and rewards of certain actions.1 8 8 Instead,
directors may engage in behavior that may be deemed to be negligentthe directors were aware of the risks and engaged in the behavior
regardless of the risks-without fear of liability for breach of the duty
of care. In the very few cases where directors were found to have
breached the duty of care, the courts engaged in a risk versus reward
analysis and determined that the directors had taken unreasonable risks.
For example, in Brane v. Roth, outside advisors recommended that a
closely held grain elevator's board of directors engage in hedging
against falling grain prices. 189 The directors did not have the expertise
to engage in hedging, and so they hired a manager.190 However, the
manager also was inexperienced in hedging. 19 1 The directors
themselves did not recognize that the manager lacked the experience to
hedge against the risk of falling grain prices, even after the financial
statements provided evidence that the manager was unsuccessful in
hedging attempts. 192 Further, the directors did not attempt to
understand hedging.1 93 The directors were held liable for breach of the
duty of care because they failed to hedge against the risk of falling grain
prices.194 Although this case provides one example where directors'
failure to assess risks led to liability, it should be noted that this is an
outlier. Few directors have been found liable for breach of the duty to
carefully oversee corporate operations.195
One possible strategy to mitigate risk bias on boards would be to
increase board worldview diversity. The next section discusses how
corporate social responsibility theories and strategies are congruent with
188. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that
absent fraud, collusion, or illegal or unconscientious acts, courts will not interfere with directors'
discretion in managing the corporation).
189. See Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that directors
breached their fiduciary duty in failing to supervise the manager).
190. Id. at 589.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 592.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the

Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 Wyo. L. REv. 481, 490-500 (2006) (discussing the standard
of liability for claims that directors failed to monitor corporate activities).
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cultural cognition theory. 19 6 The following section describes how
cultural cognition theory and critical race theory suggest similar
approaches to create worldview diverse boards that operate
effectively.197
B. Diversity and CorporateSocial Responsibility
The dominant, traditional conception of corporate law takes the
shareholder primacy norm as a given. This norm
holds that directors of public corporations ought to be accountable
only to the shareholders, and ought to be accountable only for
maximizing the value of the shareholders' shares. This perspective
rests on the conventional contractarian assumption that the
shareholders are the sole residual claimants and risk bearers in a
public firm.1 9 8
Corporate social responsibility and progressive corporate law theories
hold, in contrast, that stakeholders' interests may be as important a
driver of corporate decision making as shareholder value. 19 9 A number
of rationales underlie corporate social responsibility theories. For
example:
[O]ptions theory and the growing literature on the contracting
difficulties associated with firm-specific investment both support the
claim that a wide variety of groups are likely to bear significant
residual risk and enjoy significant residual claims on firm earnings.
These groups include not only shareholders, but also creditors,
managers, and employees. Thus economic efficiency may be best
served not by requiring corporate directors to focus solely on
shareholders' interests, but by requiring them instead to maximize the
sum of all the interests held by all the groups that bear residual risks
and hold residual claims. 2 00
Under the shareholder primacy norm, board diversity would be
desirable if it maximizes shareholder value. However, under corporate

196. See infra Part IV.B.
197. See infra Part IV.C.
198. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, DirectorAccountability and the Mediating Role of

the CorporateBoard,79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 404 (2001).
199. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in

Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738 (2006) (expressing the view that corporate directors
should balance the needs of various corporate constituencies in order to protect corporate
economic health). According to Blair and Stout, "[B]oards of directors, who alone are
empowered to make the decision about the distribution of surpluses, should try to make sure
every team member gets at least enough of the surplus to make sure all the contributing team
members are motivated to stay with the team." Id.
200. Blair & Stout, supra note 198, at 404.
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social responsibility norms, diversity would be desirable because it
could maximize stakeholders' interests as well.
Under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility, one rationale
for corporate board diversity is that a diverse board would better
represent the various stakeholder groups with which diverse directors
identify. These stakeholder groups include the communities in which
corporations operate, corporate employees, and creditors of the
corporation.
The cultural cognition hypothesis supports this rationale in the
following way. First, the hypothesis supports the notion that directors
may not be predisposed to identify with the myriad of groups that have
an interest in the corporation. Corporate directors are a relatively small,
monolithic group of individuals that tend to be white, male, and come
from the same types of educational and socioeconomic backgrounds. 20 1
Although diversity in gender and race, as previously discussed, does not
necessarily provide desired diversity of worldviews, correlations exist
between these physical characteristics and diverse views: individuals
with the above characteristics also tend to adhere to hierarchical and
individualistic worldviews. 202 Most large public corporations operate
nationally if not internationally. Thus, the communities in which
corporations operate are not likely to be homogeneous in terms of
worldviews. The purported mechanisms underlying worldviews would
tend to reinforce decision making that is in the interests of only those
corporate constituencies that hold hierarchical and individualistic
worldviews. In contrast, a diverse board would better relate to
stakeholder groups beyond those corporate constituencies.
Second, cultural cognition theory suggests that corporate
constituencies perhaps should be given greater voice in corporate
affairs. 203 Although boards and the impact of their decisions received
little attention until the late twentieth century, boards have come under
increasing scrutiny not only by legislators, regulators, institutional
investors, and other major participants in the financial markets, but also

201. See supra Part II.A.
202. See J. Flynn, P. Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race and Perception of Environmental

Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYsIs 1101, 1105-06 (1994) (analyzing evidence that white men who
are highly educated, have high incomes and who hold individualistic and hierarchical worldviews
also are highly risk skeptical when compared to women and minorities); see also Dan M. Kahan
et al., Culture and Identity, supra note 38, at 567 (discussing empirical evidence that describes a
discrete group of hierarchical, individualistic white men who are highly risk skeptical). Other
characteristics that correlate with risk perception include socioeconomic status, educational
background, and community of residence. See id. at 472.
203. See Kahan & Slovic, supra note 42, at 169-72 § II.
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by the general public. 2 04 Much of the general public is invested in
corporations through mutual funds, 401(k)s, and other instruments. In
addition, the taxpayer bailout raised the profile of executives and
boards, especially with respect to bonuses and other compensation. 205
The public perceived that executive bonuses were excessive and that
corporate boards' decisions to award bonuses were unfair. 2 06 The
relatively new SEC compensation disclosure requirements and the
Dodd-Frank Act's say-on-pay, say-on-golden parachutes, and pay-forperformance disclosure requirements indicate that legislators and
regulators are heeding viewpoints other than those of corporate
executives who assert that they are paid the going rate. 207 Of course,
legislators must heed their constituencies' calls or face election defeat,
and regulators must consider whether they will be reappointed. In
general, directors do not face the same threats to retaining their
positions on corporate boards. Perhaps more diversity on corporate
boards would have made boards more sensitive to the public outcry that
eventually accompanied ever-increasing executive compensation.
C. CriticalRace Theory and BoardDiversity

Critical race theory suggests that "race in modern America is
ubiquitous, that color-blind lawmaking is likely to address only the most
blatant racism, and that any progress occurs only when the interests of
the powerful converge with the interests of the racially oppressed." 208
Note that the racially oppressed and the powerful each retain their own
interests-progress only occurs when those interests converge. Interests
derive from a variety of factors, but extrapolated to worldviews, critical
race theory would seem to suggest that distinct worldviews may be
204. See LEBLANC & GILLIES, supra note 58, at 1; CORPORATE BD. MEMBER MAGAZINE &
FTI CONSULTING, FEELING THE HEAT: RESULTS OF THE CORPORATE BOARDIFTI CONSULTING

2010 LEGAL STUDY 2 (2010), available at http://www.boardmember.com/WorkArealinkit.aspx
?Linkldentifier-id&ItemlD=5218 (describing how directors perceive increased scrutiny from
politicians and the public on certain issues such as executive compensation and risk
management).
205. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Both Parties Play the Wall Street Card, Sometimes from the

Bottom of the Deck, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A16 (discussing how populist anger at Wall
Street fueled political campaigns in the November 2010 election cycle); This Angry Moment:
Populist Outrage Building, NPR (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/

story/story.php?storyld=102118227 (discussing a Gallup poll showing public anger at taxpayer
bailouts).
206. See Frank Ahrens, Isn't That Rich? The Bonus Controversy of 2009, WASH. POST

OUTLOOK (Jan. 3, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/speciallopinions/
outlook-bonus/ (discussing the controversy regarding corporate bonuses).
207. See supra notes 177, 182 and accompanying text (discussing the financial collapse and
responses to the crisis).
208. Ramirez, supra note 30, at 1584.
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retained, even if those worldviews converge around a common goal,
such as corporate decision making on a board.
The cultural cognition hypothesis also supports critical race theory's
claim that political debate, public policy, and law "should be informed
by the voices of people 'on the bottom' of discrimination." 209 In the
context of corporations, "[c]orporate law and corporate culture
concentrate power in the hands of privileged, middle-age white males
over the fate of (relatively more) diverse shareholders, employees and
others." 2 10 Those voices can "illuminate our understanding of
discrimination and identify the means by which to eradicate it." 211 If a
legitimate law is defined as the outcome of a process "sufficiently
connected to the will of those governed by [the result] so that we can
impute the law's commands to them," 2 12 then a legitimate decision also
should be the outcome of a similar process. In other words, legitimate
decisions should be the outcome of a process that considers the voices
of both the empowered and the disempowered in the corporate structure.
V. OVERCOMING ROADBLOCKS TO INCREASING WORLDVIEw DIVERSITY

ON CORPORATE BOARDS
Common law and state statutes provide little incentive to increase the
diversity of worldviews on corporate boards. 213 State court judges have
tended to minimize the impact of director cognitive bias on corporate
decision making, except when bias may arise from a financial interest in
a transaction. 2 14 The notion that cognitive biases may impact corporate
decision making in a way that should concern courts and legislators
only recently has begun to impact judicial and legislative actions.
Courts and legislators should give weight to the notion that cultural
cognition affects board decision making. However, corporate boards
truly concerned about governance should begin to define diversity in
terms of cultural worldviews, as well as in terms that are used more
often, such as gender and race.
209. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1284 (2000); see also
Gabaldon, supra note 30, at 546-49 (discussing critical race theory in the context of the power
structure of corporations and corporate law).
210. Gabaldon, supra note 30, at 547.
211. Carbado, supra note 209, at 1284.
212. Kahan et al., supra note 117, at 47.
213. See Burch, supra note 34, at 526-32 (stating that business judgment review provides
great deference to directors' decisions made in good faith, with due care, and in the best interests
of the corporation; courts discount cognitive biases not borne of a financial interest in the
transaction).
214. See id. at 531 (describing how state courts tend to be skeptical of shareholder claims that
directors' decisions are biased).
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The board director who is also a woman and/or a person of color
could be the only non-white, non-male board director. It may be that
due to background, the person adheres to a worldview more consistent
with the white, male majority with respect to corporate decisions and
risk profile. As described above, the research on cognitive biases
suggests that while gender and race correlate with worldviews, other
factors, such as socioeconomic status, career experiences, and
education, also influence worldviews. 2 15 Therefore, adding more
women and people of color to corporate boards may not mitigate
skewed risk perception if the addition of women and people of color
does not increase worldview diversity. What strategies could be used to
increase worldview diversity on corporate boards? What barriers to
effective communication among board members exist, and would those
barriers negate the positive impact of greater worldview diversity?
What strategies might serve to overcome these barriers? The cultural
cognition theory, critical race theory and director behavior studies shed
light on these questions and may provide the foundation for mitigating
strategies.
The following subsections identify three possible barriers that may
negate the positive and powerful impact of greater diversity-fear,
consensus and assimilation, and distrust-and discuss how these
barriers may be surmounted.
A. Fear

Research on board
Directors may fear differing viewpoints.
dynamics indicates that board cultures tend towards conservative and
consensus decision making. 2 16 While directors may be open to hearing
different viewpoints, they may not credit those viewpoints in making
decisions if the person delivering the viewpoint is perceived as being
from outside of the directors' cultural norm.
Boards may benefit from hiring consultants who may lend credibility
to the "outsider's" view. However, critical race theory suggests that
ultimately the board as a whole would need to agree that outsider
opinions are credible and should be given due weight in board
decisions.

215. See supra note 202 (discussing the effect of culture on the cognitive process).
216.

See, e.g.,

iW.

LORSCH,

PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S

CORPORATE BOARDS 91-95 (1989) (describing how board norms favor the appearance of board
consensus and support for the CEO's agenda, and disfavor forthright discussion during board
meetings).
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B. Consensus and Assimilation

Directors must understand and work within the board's and the
organization's culture without losing their unique perspectives. A good
understanding of board dynamics is important to a director's ability to
generate consensus around that director's ideas. Board dynamics result
from how directors "'fit' together and balance one another's
personality, competency and behavioral type." 2 17 Creative tension must
also exist in the boardroom. This chemistry results from the interaction
of directors who bring different interpersonal skills to the boardroom.
LeBlanc and Gillies' qualitative study of board dynamics suggests:
[A] board cannot work, that is, reach good decisions, unless there are
directors who, through credibility, leadership and interpersonal and
communication skills, are on occasion able to persuade other directors
and management of their point of view or of a particular course of
action. At the same time, a board cannot work unless there are
directors who can find common themes within dissenting views and
bring about a consensus. 2 18
Research on the experience of women and people of color on boards
indicates that these directors must prove their qualification to serve on

the board and build credibility in a way that is qualitatively different

from the experience of white male directors. 2 19 Also, research suggests
that a minimum of three directors who are women or people of color
increases the credibility of the directors and facilitates the directors'
ability to build consensus around ideas that may conflict with
established behavioral norms. 220
Does cultural cognition suggest worldviews that are more concerned
about or adept at building credibility or facilitating consensus? (One
might hypothesize that communitarians are more concerned with
Do the
facilitating consensus, but are they more adept at it?)

217.

LEBLANC & GILLIES, supra note 58, at 141.

218. Id
219. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, No SEAT AT THE TABLE: How CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
KEEPS WOMEN OUT OF AMERICA'S BOARDROOMS 161-75 (2007) (describing stereotyping and

tokenism that prevent women from advancing and remaining at the top of the corporate
hierarchy).
220. See Alison M. Konrad, Sumru Erkut & Michele J. Hooper, Critical Mass on Corporate
Boards: Why Three or More Women Enhance Governance 3-4 (Wellesley Ctrs. for Women,

Report No. WCW 11, 2006), available at http://www.wcwonline.org/pdflCriticalMassExec
Summary.pdf (asserting that greater board diversity often leads to better dispersal of information
and better decision making); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of

Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1309 (2003) (asserting that heterogeneity enhances the
ability of a group to make decisions).
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mechanisms underlying cultural cognition suggest that directors with
"outsider" worldviews also must build credibility in a different way?
C Trust
To the extent that there is significant worldview diversity on a public
company board, the board may make decisions that are more legitimate
because the board fully considered-and questioned-various
perspectives that are representative of the people affected by the board's
decisions. While the Cultural Cognition Project studies demonstrate
that diversity may have that effect, insights derived from critical race
and feminist theory show that diversity alone is not enough; board
members' views must be seen as credible. Trust is another critical
component of board dynamics, and is part of the foundation for
credibility.
Trust is built over time and arises from decisions that, in hindsight,
show good judgment. However, is trust between hierarchs and
egalitarians built in a way that is qualitatively different from the way
trust is built between hierarchs and egalitarians, or between male and
female directors?
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article asserts that cultural cognition theory, corporate social
responsibility theories and strategies, and critical race theory may shed
new light on the value of board diversity in the broad sense and
strategies to achieve diversity. The convergence of cultural cognition,
corporate social responsibility, and critical race theories could support a
broadened definition of board diversity that includes gender, race, age,
and geographic location, as well as a worldview or one's vision of the
Empirical research could determine whether the
ideal society.
worldview of a labor union representative is more or less likely to be
hierarchical or egalitarian, individualistic or communitarian. And the
same evidence could be gathered regarding CEOs and board members.
Boards with greater worldview diversity may consider a wider
variety of views and approaches to decision making. Further, while
studies at the Yale Cultural Cognition project demonstrate that gender
and racial diversity may not correlate completely with gender and racial
diversity, a strong positive correlation exists between worldviews,
gender, and race on some issues. Moreover, critical race theory
suggests that worldviews do not change merely because a person of a
certain gender or racial group participates in activities that are
characteristic or supportive of a different worldview-adding to the
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importance of determining an individual's worldview to obtain and
evaluate board diversity.
Fairness, equity, and economic considerations are legitimate and not
mutually exclusive goals of board worldview diversity. This Article has
summarized, from equity and fairness viewpoints, the rationales and the
goals for worldview diversity on corporate boards. In doing so, it has
reviewed the results from empirical studies supporting the case for
greater gender and racial diversity on corporations. The Article has
discussed research on cultural cognition and how worldview relates to
gender and race. In addition, the Article has tied together the literature
from the corporate social responsibility movement, critical race theory,
and cultural cognition research to conclude that gender, race, and
worldview diversity may lead to more legitimate business decisions.
While more diversity (in terms of gender, race, and worldviews) may
lead to more in-depth discussion of alternative courses of action, board
diversity alone may not have a large impact on board decision making.
Critical race and social science scholarship suggests that barriers may
However, the
negate the positive impact of greater diversity.
scholarship also suggests that the barriers are not insurmountable. More
research on director behavior is needed to determine the extent that
cultural cognition impacts board decision making and board members'
interactions.
This Article has proposed a number of reasons for seeking diversity
on corporate boards. While such diversity may be achieved voluntarily,
some may argue that the move to board diversity has been slow, and
that nonvoluntary measures are needed. Unfortunately, while courts
may be willing in various degrees to recognize both conscious and
unconscious bias, to date no cases consider failure to diversify along
worldview, gender, or racial lines as an argument in favor of finding a
breach of fiduciary duty.221 Other countries mandate board diversity.222
However, their corporate governance, economic, and political systems
differ from these systems in the United States to such a degree that it is
more likely that greater worldview diversity would become inculcated
into standard business practices than such legal requirements would be
adopted in the United States. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to
221. See supra notes 213-14.
222.

See Percent of Women Board Directors in Select Countries, CATALYST, http://www

.catalyst.org/publication/433/women-on-boards (last visited Mar. 24, 2011). As of December
2010, six countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway, Spain, Israel, and Quebec) mandated gender
diversity, ranging from at least one woman on the board to at least 40 percent women. Other
countries implemented mandatory disclosure rules (e.g., United States) or encourage diversity as
a best practice (e.g., Australia and Sweden).
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hypothesize that such requirements would lead to more equitable and
legitimate decision making.

